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THE DOG DAYS SHOULD BE OVER: THE INEQUALITY
BETWEEN THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF APARTMENT
DWELLERS AND THOSE OF HOMEOWNERS WITH RESPECT
TO DRUG DETECTION DOGS
ABSTRACT
Recent judicial opinions throughout the country have muddied the waters concerning the extent of privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment beyond the walls of an individual’s home. More specifically, courts
have drawn a distinction between an apartment dweller’s privacy rights and
the privacy rights of a homeowner concerning drug detection dogs. In Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court of the United States held the use of a drug
detection dog on a front porch violates the homeowner's constitutional rights.
In State v. Nguyen, the North Dakota Supreme Court followed the Eighth and
other federal circuit courts to distinguish a common apartment building from
a home. The Nguyen court held law enforcement officers' investigation using
drug detection dogs in a secured common hallway was neither a trespass nor
a violation of the expectation of privacy. This Note will discuss the history
and extent of the Fourth Amendment’s protections, the history of the use of
dogs in investigation, and the Fourth Amendment protections concerning
drug detection dogs. In addition, this Note will argue that both homeowners
and apartment dwellers should enjoy equal privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment.

662

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92:661

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 662
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY AND PURPOSE ............ 662
A. CURTILAGE - FOURTH AMENDMENT EXTENDS BEYOND THE
WALLS OF THE HOME .............................................................. 663
B. STANDARDS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS .......... 664
1. Common Law Trespass Theory .........................................665
2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ...................................667
III. DOG SNIFFS IN INVESTIGATIONS ............................................... 668
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF DRUG DOG SNIFFS
IN HOMES AND APARTMENTS ................................................ 671
A. HOMEOWNER’S RIGHTS: FLORIDA V. JARDINES ....................... 671
B. APARTMENT DWELLER’S RIGHTS............................................ 673
1. Federal Circuit Split Regarding the “Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy” in Common Areas of Multi-Family
Dwellings ...........................................................................674
2. North Dakota Relevant Post Florida v. Jardines Cases ....675
V. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................ 677
VI. CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 679

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Note will discuss the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the role of drug detection dogs in law enforcement investigations today, and the inequality of Fourth Amendment protections concerning dog
sniffs outside the door of homeowners versus individuals living in an apartment or multi-family dwelling. After examining Fourth Amendment protections of dog sniffs with respect to different living situations, this Note will
advocate for equal constitutional protections for homeowners and apartment
dwellers from warrantless searches involving drug detection dogs.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY AND PURPOSE
Over the past century, the United States Supreme Court has frequently
considered the extent of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth
Amendment reads:
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1
This section will discuss the extension of Fourth Amendment protections
beyond the walls of a home and the standards for Fourth Amendment protection.
A. CURTILAGE - FOURTH AMENDMENT EXTENDS BEYOND THE WALLS
OF THE HOME
The concept of curtilage being within the constitutionally protected area
of an individual’s home originated under the open fields doctrine. The first
relevant case concerning open fields and curtilage was United States v. Hester.2 In Hester, the appellant was convicted of violating Prohibition statutes
by concealing moonshine.3 The appellant claimed the search that led to his
conviction violated his Fourth Amendment rights because law enforcement
officers trespassed onto private property.4 The Court held that since the
moonshine was in an open field, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.5 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes birthed the open fields doctrine, stating, "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to
the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to
the open fields." Justice Holmes provided further support for the open fields
doctrine by stating "[t]he distinction between [the open field] and the house
is as old as the common law.”6 However, he did not define open field or
curtilage, which posed issues in the application of the new rules by courts
and law enforcement.7
Shortly after Hester, the Court attempted to define curtilage in Olmstead
v. United States.8 In Olmstead, the Court determined the degree of actual

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
3. Id. at 58.
4. Id. at 59 (explaining that “Examination of the vessels took place upon Hester’s father’s
land.”).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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physical intrusion would be the dispositive test in residential searches and
seizures challenged under the Fourth Amendment.9 The Court declared only
a “physical invasion of [an individual's] house “or curtilage’”would fall under the scope of the Fourth Amendment.10
In 1984, after the Court decided Katz,11 the open fields doctrine was revived in Oliver v. United States.12 Rather than analyzing each open-fields
case individually under the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the
Court implemented a bright line rule.13 This bright line rule stated that “an
individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free
from warrantless intrusion by government officers.”14 The Court also determined the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home,”
also known as the curtilage, is “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes.”15 Thus, areas outside of the home and curtilage were determined
to be per se excluded from the protection of the Fourth Amendment.16
Three years after the Court decided Oliver, the Court echoed the revitalization of the open fields doctrine in United States v. Dunn.17 The Court
recognized that prior case law did not provide insight into determining where
constitutionally protected curtilage ends and constitutionally unprotected
open fields begin.18 Therefore, the Court set forth four factors for determining whether an area is constitutionally protected curtilage.19 The Dunn factors include (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
(2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home,
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps taken to
protect the area from observation by people passing by.20
B. STANDARDS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Over the course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States
Supreme Court has utilized two theories to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment applies. This section will discuss the common law trespass the-

9. Id. at 466.
10. Id.
11. See infra note 40.
12. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
13. Id. at 181.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 180.
16. Id. at 183-84.
17. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
18. Id. at 301.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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ory that was the only test used until 1967. In addition, this section will discuss the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test announced in 1967 in Katz
v. United States.
1.

Common Law Trespass Theory

In 1928, the common law trespass theory was introduced in Olmstead v.
United States.21 In Olmstead, federal officers obtained information via an
intercepted phone conversation regarding a possible violation of the National
Prohibition Act.22 Importantly, the federal agents who intercepted the phone
conversation did not enter the defendant’s premises.23 Rather, the agents
tapped the conversations from the basement of a large office building and on
public streets.24 The majority of the Court took a literal approach to the text
of the Fourth Amendment, and held that only a “physical invasion of [an individual’s house ‘or curtilage’] constituted a Fourth Amendment search.”25
The phone wiretaps were installed on public lines outside the defendant’s
property; thus, the wiretaps were not a physical intrusion.26 Accordingly, the
Court determined the federal agents did not violate the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.27
After Olmstead, several cases followed the common law trespass theory,
including Goldman v. United States, On Lee v. United States, and Silverman
v. United States. First, in Goldman, government agents obtained evidence
after installing a detectaphone in the wall of the defendant’s office.28 The
Court found there was no physical trespass; thus, the search did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.29 Next, in On Lee, a wired informant working for
the government entered the defendant’s store and engaged him in conversation.30 During the conversation, the defendant made incriminating admissions that were heard and testified to by a government agent.31 Subsequently,
the defendant challenged the testimony as violating his Fourth Amendment
21. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
22. Id. at 456.
23. Id. at 457.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 466 (stating “The Fourth Amendment . . . [is not] violated . . . unless there has been
an official search and seizure of [an individual’s] person, or such a seizure of his papers or
his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the
purpose of making a seizure.”).
26. Id.
27. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
28. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1942), overruled in part by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. Id. at 134-35.
30. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952).
31. Id.
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rights.32 The Court held there was no physical trespass because the informant
entered with the defendant’s consent and the information was transmitted to
an agent outside the shop.33 Therefore, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated.34 Finally, in Silverman, the police gained consent
from an adjacent building’s owner to use as an observation post to investigate
whether the defendant’s premises was the headquarters of a gambling operation.35 In the observation post, the officer installed a “spike mike” listening
device that was wedged in the heating duct of the defendant’s house.36 After
officers testified to the defendant’s incriminating statements at trial, the defendant argued the testimony violated his Fourth Amendment rights.37 The
Supreme Court held the means by which law enforcement procured the statement was a “physical penetration” into the defendant’s premises.38 Thus, the
physical intrusion constituted a violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.39
Six years after Silverman was decided, the Supreme Court announced a
new Fourth Amendment standard in Katz v. United States.40 This standard
will be more thoroughly discussed in the next section. Many people thought
Katz did away with the common law trespass test as discussed by the Rakas
v. Illinois Court.41 The Rakas majority said:
[i]n the course of repudiating the doctrine derived from Olmstead v.
United States, . . . the Court in Katz held that capacity to claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property
right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims
the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place.42
However, in 2012, forty-six years after the Supreme Court decided Katz,
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in United States v. Jones.43 In Jones,

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 751.
Id.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961).
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 511-12.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
Id. (citations omitted).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
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the defendant was under investigation for suspicion of trafficking narcotics.44
In the process of the investigation, law enforcement procured a warrant authorizing them to attach a Global Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device
to the defendant’s vehicle to monitor his movements within ten days.45 After
the expiration of the warrant, law enforcement attached the device while the
defendant’s car was parked on a public street.46 The trial court applied the
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.47 The defendant appealed asserting the unwarranted attachment of the GPS device violated his Fourth Amendment rights.48 The Court
applied the common law trespass test to determine the placement of the GPS
device on the defendant’s car was a physical intrusion on his property; thus,
it was a Fourth Amendment search.49 Further, the Supreme Court held even
though the Court had gone away from using the physical intrusion standard
for some time, the Katz test of “reasonable expectation of privacy” supplemented, but did not replace, the common law trespass test.50
2.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court required a physical intrusion or common law trespass for a Fourth Amendment violation.
However, in 1967, the Court did away with this approach and determined
physical intrusion was not required for a Fourth Amendment violation.51 In
Katz, law enforcement attached an electronic eavesdropping device to the
outside of a telephone booth.52 The conversations picked up by the device
contained information that led to the petitioner’s arrest and were permitted to
be introduced at trial.53 Both parties argued the Olmstead constitutionally
protected area approach, but the Court disregarded the approach.54 Rather,
the majority stated “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”55

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 949.
49. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
50. Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely
the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” (also see Knotts and Kyllo discussing the supplementary nature of the Katz test rather
than the replacement of the common law trespass test.)).
51. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
52. Id. at 348.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 349-50.
55. Id. at 351 (“[T]his effort to decide whether or not a given ‘“area,”‘ viewed in the abstract,
is ‘“constitutionally protected’” deflects attention from the problem presented by this
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More specifically, the Court declared that the proper analysis centers on
whether the search or seizure “violate[s] the privacy upon which [the petitioner] justifiably relied.”56 Accordingly, what a petitioner would justifiably
expect to preserve as private constitutes a constitutionally protected area subject to Fourth Amendment protections, even if it is publicly accessible.57 The
Court determined that for the purposes of Fourth Amendment protection, a
constitutionally protected area need not be private property that the government must physically intrude to gain access.58
The current standard did not originate in the majority opinion. Rather,
in his concurrence, Justice Harlan described the well-known twofold “reasonable expectation of privacy” requirement.59 Thus, to be considered a
“search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, the government must both (1) exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) the expectation must
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.60 It is important
to remember, the Katz test of “reasonable expectation of privacy” did not
replace the common law trespass test; rather, it provided an additional avenue
to determine whether an area is constitutionally protected.61
III. DOG SNIFFS IN INVESTIGATIONS
Law enforcement’s use of dogs originated in Belgium in 1899.62 Over
fifty years later, in 1957, the first successful organized canine unit was implemented in the United States.63 Shortly after, in 1970, the United States
Customs Service began using dogs to detect drugs.64 Since then, drug detection dogs have become commonplace in the United States.65 Dogs can be
trained to detect and alert authorities to the presence of heroin, marijuana,

case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.” (internal citations omitted)).
56. Id.
57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 360-61 (J. Harlan concurring).
60. Id. at 361.
61. Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the
transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” (also see
Knotts and Kyllo discussing the supplementary nature of the Katz test rather than the replacement
of the common law trespass test.)).
62. Shannon R. Hurley-Deal, State v. Fisher: Canine Sniffs – Who Let the Dogs Out?, 26 N.C.
CENT. L. J. 47, 47 (2003).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 51.
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cocaine, and other drugs.66 In fact, in the United States, drug detection dogs
have proven so successful, they are employed in many airports, bus stations,
and border locations.67
Dogs are useful to law enforcement because of their exceptionally powerful olfactory sense, also known as sense of smell.68 Dogs have up to three
hundred million olfactory receptors compared to six million in humans.69 Put
another way, “[i]f laid out, the surface area of a dog's olfactory cells would
cover a space equivalent to the skin area of the dog's body. In comparison,
the surface area of human olfactory cells would cover no more than a postage
stamp.”70 Thus, proportionally speaking, the portion of a dog’s brain devoted
to smell is about forty times greater than that of a human brain.71 Throughout
the United States, the “play-reward” method is widely used to train drugdetection dogs.72 The Supreme Court of Oregon described the commonly
used method in State v. Foster73 stating:
The dogs are trained to detect heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine,
and marijuana. Initially, the handler exposes the dog to a training
aid such as a tennis ball that has been submerged in the drug and
familiarizes the dog with the odor by playing with it. Then the
trainer hides the ball, and the dog learns to sniff it out. Next, the
trainer hides the drug rather than a tennis ball. When the dog finds
the drug, it is rewarded by being allowed to play with a favorite
toy.74
The dogs and their handlers are then tested to determine if they are sufficiently accurate to become certified.75 The court in Foster described the
testing procedure as follows:

66. Judyth Sassoon, Canine Substance Detection, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (June 26, 2017, 6:48
PM), http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/united-states-and-canada/us-history/detection-dogs.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Peter
Tyson,
Dogs’
Dazzling
Sense
of
Smell,
(Oct.
2012),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/nature/dogs-sense-of-smell.html.
70. Hurley-Deal, supra note 62, at 51.
71. Peter Tyson, supra note 69.
72. See State v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292, 295 (Or. 2011).
73. Id. (The Foster court looked to the training of drug-detecting dogs to determine whether
the dog in question in the case was adequately trained in comparison to the commonly used “playreward” method).
74. Id. (quoting State v. Foster, 225 P.3d 830, 835 (Or. Ct. App. 2010)).
75. Foster, 252 P.3d at 295.
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After the dog and the handler have worked together for a significant
period of time, they are eligible for testing . . . [T]the test involves
[testing the dog's ability to detect the presence of drug-scented items
in two rooms, three vehicles, seven packages, and an open area. To
prevent handler cuing and to force the teams to perform under stress,
the handler does not know how many items, if any, the dog should
alert to on each deployment.] Each environment may have up to
three drug packages hidden in it, or may have none at all. The environments also have distractors, such as dirty clothing and urine. [To
pass the portion of the test in rooms and vehicles, a dog must have
at least a 90 percent accuracy rate. For the packages and open area,
the dog must be 100 percent accurate.] Approximately 25 percent of
the dogs fail the test. If a dog passes the test, it is certified for one
year and must complete the test again to be recertified.76
The constitutionality of using drug detection dogs in law enforcement
has been challenged in state and federal courts.77 Notably, in United States
v. Place the Supreme Court found dog sniffs of the exterior of luggage to be
constitutional.78 In Place, drug enforcement agents detained the defendant at
an airport and used a drug detection dog to sniff his luggage.79 The Court
found a brief seizure of the luggage to perform a dog sniff was appropriate
and did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search because it did not involve
physically opening or exposing the defendant’s items.80 In addition, the
Court noted the sniff was solely designed to reveal the presence of contraband.81 Therefore, the Court concluded the sniff was not a Fourth Amendment search.82
Many years later, in 2005, the Supreme Court was faced with another
case concerning a warrantless drug detection dog search in Illinois v. Caballes.83 In Caballes, law enforcement conducted a lawful traffic stop of the
respondent’s vehicle for speeding.84 While the first state trooper wrote out a
warning ticket for the defendant, a second trooper arrived on the scene with
his drug detection dog and walked the dog around the respondent’s car.85 The
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
Id. at 699.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 405 (2005).
Id. at 406.
Id.
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dog alerted to the presence of marijuana in the respondent’s trunk.86 Subsequently, the troopers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and the respondent
was convicted with a drug offense.87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine whether the Fourth Amendment required reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify a dog sniff of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop.88 The
Court held the dog sniff did not implicate legitimate privacy interests because
it was performed on the exterior of the car during a legitimate traffic stop.89
The Court determined “[a]ny intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations
[does] not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.”90
In sum, with respect to drug detection dogs, prior to Florida v. Jardines,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that dog inspection of luggage in an airport
and dog inspection of an automobile during a lawful traffic stop do not violate
the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. Thus, dog sniffs, in
the contexts listed above, are not searches under the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. The next section will discuss the Jardines91 case, where the
Court first considered the application of prior dog sniff decisions in the context of the home.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF DRUG DOG SNIFFS
IN HOMES AND APARTMENTS
The protection of the Fourth Amendment varies depending on an individual’s living situation. Per case law, homeowners have been given more
constitutional protection than their apartment dwelling counterparts concerning the area outside their door.92 This section will look at the legal background of homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights as discussed by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Jardines. Additionally, this section will discuss
the current law surrounding Fourth Amendment protections of individuals
living in apartments and multi-family dwellings.
A. HOMEOWNER’S RIGHTS: FLORIDA V. JARDINES
One year after Jones, the Supreme Court was faced with a similar Fourth
Amendment argument in Florida v. Jardines.93 In Jardines, law enforcement

86. Id.
87. Id. at 406-07.
88. Id. at 407.
89. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
90. Id. at 409.
91. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
92. Compare Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1409 with United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th
Cir. 1977) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment hallway).
93. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
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took a drug detection dog to the defendant’s front porch without a warrant.94
The dog positively alerted officers to the presence of drugs.95 Subsequently,
law enforcement used the information to procure a warrant to search the
home, during which they found illegal drugs and charged the defendant accordingly.96 The trial court suppressed the evidence finding it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.97 On appeal, the Supreme
Court agreed, holding the front porch was constitutionally protected curtilage,98 officers did not have an implied license to be there with drug detection
dogs,99 and law enforcement physically intruded on the constitutionally protected area in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.100
In the Court’s finding that the porch was curtilage, it did not reach an
analysis of the Dunn factors.101 Rather, the Court looked to the Oliver
Court’s standard, which states “[w]hile the boundaries of the curtilage are
generally ‘clearly marked,’ the ‘conception defining the curtilage’ is at any
rate familiar enough that it is ‘easily understood from our daily experience.’”102 Thus, the Court determined the front porch is undoubtedly curtilage because it is an area where it is obvious that “the activity of home life
extends.”103
After determining the front porch was curtilage, the Court looked to
whether the officer acted reasonably, or if it was an unlicensed physical intrusion.104 The Court discussed that a police officer without a warrant “may
approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’”105 While the Court recognized this implied warranty,
it drew a line expressing there is no “customary invitation” to introduce “a
trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.”106 Therefore, the Court determined the officer’s
conduct was beyond the scope of the license implied to an individual seeking
to utilize the porch to attempt an entry.107
94. Id. at 1413.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1415.
99. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
100. Id. at 1417-18.
101. Id. at 1414-15.
102. Id. at 1415 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182, n.12 (1984) (internal
quotations omitted)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1415.
105. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1417.
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Accordingly, the Court determined law enforcement’s conduct was an
unlicensed intrusion on a constitutionally protected area, the defendant’s curtilage, which was a similar situation to Jones.108 Thus, the Court reiterated
the holding in Jones stating “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by
physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a ‘search’ within
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’”109 The Court determined the officer’s use of drug detection dogs to
investigate the home on the front porch is a “search” within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.110
Justice Kagan, along with Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, concurred with the majority decision, and provided an analysis of the Jardines
case on privacy grounds.111 Justice Kagan determined the search was unreasonable under both a property and privacy analysis.112 She stated the Kyllo
v. United States Court established a “firm” and “bright” rule that is applicable
in this case.113 The standard reads: “[w]here as here, the Government uses a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”114 Justice Kagan determined drug detection dogs are not “in general
public use” and the dogs were used to “explore details of the home that they
would not otherwise have discovered without entering the premises.”115
Therefore, Justice Kagan argues absent a warrant or exigent circumstance,
the search is unreasonable under a privacy analysis.116
B. APARTMENT DWELLER’S RIGHTS
Unlike homeowners, there is no set standard for Fourth Amendment protection of the area outside the door of individuals living in apartments or
multi-family dwellings. This section will discuss the federal circuit split on
the issue. Additionally, this section will discuss two cases relevant to North

108. Id.
109. Id. at 1414 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, at 406 n.37 (2012)).
110. Id. at 1417-18.
111. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J. concurring).
112. Id. at 1418-19.
113. Id. at 1419.
114. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding a search is unreasonable
when law enforcement committed no trespass, but used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat
emanating from a private home)); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717-18 (1984)
(holding warrantless beeper-assisted surveillance inside a home is unreasonable).
115. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J. concurring).
116. Id. at 1419-20.
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Dakota law concerning Fourth Amendment protections in common hallways
of multi-family dwellings: State v. Nguyen and United States v. Matthews.
1.

Federal Circuit Split Regarding the “Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy” in Common Areas of Multi-Family
Dwellings

The Federal Circuits are split concerning whether there exists an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of multi-family
dwellings. The Majority view does not recognize a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the common areas for tenants in an apartment or multi-family
dwelling. 117 On the other hand, the Minority view recognizes such a right
under certain circumstances discussed below.118
The Majority view, consisting of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, have consistently held that individuals living in multi-family dwellings do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the common or shared areas.119 Most relevant, the Eighth Circuit has found no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a duplex vestibule,120 duplex hallway closet,121 multi-family dwelling basement storage
locker accessible to all residents,122 the landing of a secure apartment building,123 and a conversation taking place in a secure apartment building common hallway.124 In addition, prior to the Jardines decision, other Circuits
have found no legitimate expectation of privacy in a condominium parking
garage,125 common hallways of a secured apartment building, 126 and common areas of apartment buildings.127 Also, many states, such as Tennessee,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, have followed this
view.128
Alternatively, the Second and Sixth Circuit do not agree. The Sixth Circuit’s minority view has recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the hallway or common areas of an apartment when an officer enters without

117. State v. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, 841 N.W.2d 676, 680.
118. Id. at 680-81 (citing United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1976)).
119. Id. at 680.
120. See United States v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2002).
121. See United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999).
122. See United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1984).
123. See United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1980).
124. See Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816.
125. See United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976).
126. See United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Acosta,
965 F.2d 1248, 1253 (3rd Cir. 1992); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993).
127. See United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991).
128. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, ¶ 9, 841 N.W.2d 676.
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permission and the building is locked.129 The court stated, “[a]ny entry into
a locked apartment building without permission, exigency, or a warrant is
prohibited [by the Fourth Amendment].”130 Additionally, the Second Circuit
found there is a “heightened expectation of privacy inside [a] dwelling” and
held the use of drug detection dogs in the hallway of a locked apartment
building constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.131 The Minority view
would afford Fourth Amendment protection to apartment dwellers from warrantless drug detection dog searches in the common hallways of the building
similar to the protection afforded to homeowners under Jardines.
2.

North Dakota Relevant Post Florida v. Jardines Cases

Recently, there have been two relevant cases decided concerning drug
detection dogs in common hallways of apartments. The first, State v. Nguyen,
was decided by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The second, United States
v. Matthews, originated in Minnesota and was appealed to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
First, in Nguyen, law enforcement received a report of marijuana odor
on the second floor of an apartment building.132 The controlled access apartment building had secured common hallways where personal property, like
shoes, bikes, and door decorations, were present.133 While investigating the
apartment building, ununiformed officers caught the door behind a tenant of
the apartment and brought in a drug detection dog to walk it through the second floor.134 The dog was drawn to the defendant’s door and alerted to the
presence of drugs.135 The information from the dog was used to obtain a
search warrant, and as a result, incriminating evidence was gathered.136 The
trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, and the State appealed
to the North Dakota Supreme Court arguing the use of a drug detection dog
in secured apartment common hallways did not amount to an unconstitutional
search.137
The defendant argued the use of the dog was a physical intrusion into the
defendant’s constitutionally protected area under Jardines.138 The Court disregarded this argument because the common hallway outside of an apartment
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See, e.g., Carriger, 541 F.2d at 550.
See United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985).
Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, ¶ 2, 841 N.W.2d 676.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d 676.
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is distinguishable from the area surrounding a home because of the much
lower legitimate expectation of privacy in common hallways.139 Thus, the
common hallway is not within the curtilage of the defendant’s apartment.140
Ultimately, the Court looked to Eighth Circuit precedent establishing that the
common hallways of multiple-family dwellings did not enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy.141 Therefore, the Court determined the dog sniff in
the defendant’s apartment hallway was not an illegal Fourth Amendment
search.142
In Matthews, a recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, law enforcement received a report implicating the defendant as a suspect in multiple
crimes.143 The defendant lived in a “large, secure apartment building, to
which the owner had granted police all-hours access by placing a key in an
outdoor box.”144 As a result, on two occasions, police went to the defendant’s
building with a drug detection dog to conduct a drug sniff in the common
hallway.145 The dog alerted to the officers the presence of drugs outside the
defendant’s apartment door.146 The information from the dog sniff was used
to procure a warrant to search the defendant’s apartment where incriminating
evidence was found leading to the defendant’s indictment.147 Subsequently,
the defendant filed a motion to suppress, and the district court denied the
motion.148
On appeal, the defendant argued the positive alerts constituted “warrantless searches in violation of [the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights]” under Jardines.149 The Court did not reach the question posed by the defendant’s argument because binding precedent existed in the Eighth Circuit to
which law enforcement could have reasonably relied.150 Prior case law provided with respect to an officer’s reasonable reliance on binding circuit precedent sanctioning such drug dog sniffs, “the exclusionary rule did not preclude the use of that evidence in search-warrant application.”151 Thus, the
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Id. at ¶ 13.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 13.
United States v. Matthews, 784 F.3d 1232, 1234 (2015).
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Court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress without reaching the question of whether the dog sniff was a Fourth Amendment search under
Jardines.152
V. ARGUMENT
After analyzing information applicable to the use of drug detection dogs
near places of living, an inequality of constitutional protections for homeowners versus apartment dwellers exists. This section will discuss three reasons that the same constitutional protection that extends to the front porch of
a home should apply to the common hallways of an apartment building.
Therefore, warrantless searches would constitute a violation of the apartment
dweller’s Fourth Amendment rights.
First, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallways of a secured apartment building, which satisfies the Katz standard and
demands constitutional protection. Notwithstanding precedent in some jurisdictions that determined common hallways in apartment buildings do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, a secured door that restricts access
to an apartment building in and of itself demonstrates a reasonable expectation of privacy. The locked door serves as a barrier to accessing the building
for non-tenants and uninvited guests. This shows a constitutionally protected
interest in privacy and security by preventing strangers from meandering
about the hallways, even police accompanied by drug detection dogs. Restricting access to the building is a reasonable demonstration of an expectation of privacy. Thus, the Katz standard has been satisfied, and a warrantless
search of the area should be deemed unconstitutional.
Moreover, using drug detection dogs near the entrance of a dwelling
should be presumptively unreasonable because they are not in general public
use and are used to explore details of the dwelling that law enforcement could
not perceive unassisted. In the Jardines concurring opinion, Justice Kagan
analyzed the case using the “firm” and “bright” line rule announced in Kyllo.
Under this analysis, Kyllo should directly apply to a warrantless search using
drug detection dogs, regardless of the type of dwelling. The use of a dog
trained to detect drugs should not be considered “in general public use” because of their unique training and ability to detect and respond to specific
scents. In addition, law enforcement agents use the highly trained dogs to
determine the existence of things that “would previously have been unknowable” but for the use of the drug detection dogs. Given the firm and bright
line rule announced in Kyllo, the use of drug detection dogs on any dwelling,

152. Id. at 1235-36.
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absent a search warrant or exigent circumstances, should constitute an unreasonable search in violation of the homeowner or apartment dweller’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
Finally, the common hallway of an apartment building should be considered curtilage, and in turn, should be protected similar to the constitutionally protected front porch in Jardines. An analysis of the Dunn factors should
indicate the hallways of an apartment building, especially around the door
frame, are curtilage. The Dunn factors include (1) the proximity to the home,
(2) whether the area is included within the enclosure surrounding the home,
(3) the nature of the area’s use, and (4) steps taken to protect observation the
area from observation by people passing by.153
The first Dunn factor applies because the secured apartment hallway is
right outside the entrance to the apartment. With respect to the second factor,
the hallways are enclosed by the walls of the apartment building; thus, the
hallways are within the area protected by the locked door which secures access to the building. The third factor applies because the nature of the area’s
use is first, foremost, and arguably exclusively to access apartment units.
This is the same purpose as a front porch to a home. In addition, the area
immediately outside an apartment door often contains personal items such as
welcome mats and door signs facing the hallway. Thus, the nature of the
area’s use is similar to that of a porch, which has been deemed constitutionally protected curtilage. Finally, the fourth factor applies because there have
been clear steps taken to prevent observation. The building is secured and
restricts access to those who do not have keys; thus, the only people that have
access to the common hallway are those who live there and their invited
guests.
After analyzing the Dunn factors with respect to common hallways of
secured apartment buildings, the common hallways should be considered curtilage. Therefore, following Jardines, the area should be constitutionally protected. This constitutional protection would provide equal privacy rights to
the area directly outside the entrance to a living situation, no matter whether
the individual chooses to live in an apartment or a detached home.
A deciding factor between an individual choosing between living in an
apartment or a house should not be differing constitutional protections from
drug-sniffing dogs. There is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallways of a secured apartment building. Moreover, the area outside
an apartment door should be considered constitutionally protected curtilage.
Thus, the constitutional rights of both homeowners and apartment dwellers

153. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
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to “retreat into [their] own home[s] and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”154 should apply equally.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall, this Note explored the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the Supreme Court and other courts have utilized in arriving at
decisions concerning the constitutionality of drug-detecting dog sniffs. Such
doctrines consist of the open fields doctrine, including the importance of deciphering the extent of a home’s curtilage, and the standards for Fourth
Amendment protection, including the common law trespass test and the Katz
“reasonable expectation of privacy test.” In addition, this Note explores the
unique qualifications of law enforcement dogs and the Supreme Court’s prior
case law regarding dog sniffs. Finally, this Note considers the inequality between homeowners Fourth Amendment protections under Jardines, and that
of apartment dwellers concerning the areas outside their respective doors. It
also advocates for equal constitutional protections for homeowners and apartment dwellers alike.
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